Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement

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タイトル，著者，概要	本文（PDF)
"Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement" (2009年2月) 　丹野　忠晋（跡見学園女子大学准教授）概要　This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable against the competition after a potential veto to take part in bid-rigging. JEL classification codes: C72, D44, D82, L44, H57. Keywords: bid rigging, collusion, procurement, ratifiability	CPDP 37-E(PDF:259KB)

タイトル，著者，概要

本文
（PDF)

"Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement" (2009年2月)
　丹野　忠晋（跡見学園女子大学准教授）
概要
　This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable against the competition after a potential veto to take part in bid-rigging.
JEL classification codes: C72, D44, D82, L44, H57.
Keywords: bid rigging, collusion, procurement, ratifiability

CPDP
37-E(PDF:259KB)