Comments on Innovation, Network Externalities, Intellectual Property Right

(1) Monopoly caused by Network Externalities(2) Optimum Protection of Intellectual Property Right

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Network Externalities: Problems


Prof. Bressnahan and Prof. Goto: Microsoft OS has monopoly power based on network externality, and use it as a leverage to drive out the competitor, Netscape, from the browser market. This fact will harm innovation incentives of challengers.


 \rightarrow Agree. But problems are in the next step

- Solution:Prohibiting anti-competitive actions is not sufficient solution, because the browser also has network externalities.
 - Even if MS stops all anti-competitive actions <u>now</u>, the dominance of IE will not erode, because compatibility among browsers is incomplete.
 - Example: Word and Excel.
 - Problem is not actions, but monopoly itself caused by network externalities.
- Counter argument: "Innovation can/will defeat the monopoly". (R. Schmalensee)
 - Defendants for MS argue that the innovation could defeat MS. See history of spreadsheet: Visiculc → Multiplan → Lotus123 → Excel
 - We should estimate and compare the effect of innovation and network externalities. Question:which is larger, innovation or network externalities?

An approach to this issue

- Start: High and stable share or profit. Strategic(predatory) pricing.
- Step 1: Estimate network externality
 - Compare the effect of network externality with functional changes by innovations.
- Step 2: Evaluate losses from monopoly
 - Price: Does price decrease continuously?
 - Innovations: Does the speed of innovation get slower?
- Step3: Consider solutions' cost and benefits
 - Make interface open
 - Disintegrate the firm and product






Excel's share increased to reach 80%. Its dominant share has been stable since 1997.

Note that Excel's share beat lotus's share in 1996

Tentative Results			C1
dependent variable: n	Share is significant		
Variables	Coeff.	t-stat	at 10% level
Intercept	8.937867	13.8923	
Share	0.017178	1.914577	1% point share increase
Academic	-0.72022	-3.5874	raises the price by 1.7%.
Upgrade	-0.47842	-2.71379	So, 70% difference of the
Function1	0.313891	1.300195	share generates 120%
Function2	0.266078	0.533042	difference of the price
Function3	-0.02207	-0.08281	
D_99	-0.1538	-0.55657	Functions are not
D_00	-0.23122	-0.77554	significant.
D_01	-0.28539	-0.93733	
D_02	-0.44826	-1.37464	
n	39		It is difficult to
R2	0.605		overcome the network
Adjusted R2	0.464		externalities by new
Source of retail pr	functions		
Method of estimation			

Step1: Estimate network externalities and innovation effects

Step1(cont.) Comparison with Brynjolfsson's result



Why?

Network externality becomes strong.(1)File exchange is common because of the penetration of Internet(2)Increase of (non expert) users

Coefficient is small. 1% share increase raises the price by 0.75%. 50% difference of the share generates 37.5% difference of the price.

Functions are significant and have almost the same amount effect on price as share


Functional innovations can overcome network externality

Step2: Losses of Monopoly


Questionnaire on innovations Evaluate the benefit of new version of Excel

Price:

Retail Price : Excel vs Lotus, unit=yen



Tentative conclusion of spreadsheet




Intellectual property right : Problem

Prof Bresnahan and Prof Goto: Optimal protection of intellectual property right should be determined from the economic point of view, not legal point of view. Optimal level depends on the comparison between the incentive for innovation (appropriablity) and the benefit of sharing.

> Agree. But problem is in the next step

•How do we know the optimum level?

- Example-1: Casual copying of music CD. Recording Associates argue that casual copying reduces income and incentive of creators. Should we strengthen the IPR?
- Example-2: Making the Interface open in the Microsoft case. Defendants of MS argue that such a solution discourages the incentive of developing the interface.



Example-1: casual copy

Reasoning of CCCD(Copy Controlled CD)


Benefit of casual copying < loss of incentive damage (=sales reduction)

If the casual copy reduces the sale, sales of CCCD should increase because the casual copy is blocked.

However, sales of CCCD decreased or was not affected.

 \rightarrow No incentive damage

benefits



dependent variable In(sale), period 2001:March-2003:Augus

	Single		Album	
	Coefficientt	-statistic	Coefficientt	-statistic
С	10.484	166.10	11.031	192.83
CCCD	-0.275	-2.73	0.014	0.09
FIRST	-0.147	-1.22	-0.234	-1.59
ENKA	-0.749	-4.88	0.034	0.24
RW	0.528	6.99	0.903	8.17
TIEUP	0.378	5.09		
R2	0.111		0.084	
Adjusted F	0.106		0.079	

CCCD: dummy 1 for Copy Controlled CD

first: dummy 1 for the special pack of the first release version

enka: dummy 1 for "enka" genre

RW: dummy 1 if the singer has been enlisted in the end-year song festival TieUp: dummy 1 if the song is used in other contents such as TV drama or CM

Example-2: Opening the interface

- Questionnaire Survey to entrepreneurs
 - Q: How much return is sufficient incentive to your project?
 - Q: Let us assume that government introduces new rule that set an upper limit to the revenue from the intellectual property right. Do you exit from the entrepreneur activities?
 - Q: Let us assume that Windows' API became the public goods and MS lost most of its revenue. Do you, as an entrepreneur, feel you are discouraged because of government take away you would make your technologies standard

Summary

- Network Externalities and Intellectual Property Rights bring the new problems to competition policy.
- Empirical analysis is necessary to answer to these problems
 - Is the effect of network externalities larger than innovation?
 - Where is the optimum protection level of IPR?
- Not legal issue, rather economic issue (empirical question)
- If there is sufficient funds and human resource, we can do such an empirical research.

I expect this research center will do it

Thank you.

Competition policy in general

No innovation

No network externality No scale economy

Network externality Scale economy Traditional (Anti-trust law)

Natural monopoly (Regulatory laws) IPR (patent system)

IT industries

(unknown)


Innovation

• If innovation is large enough to overcome the monopoly based on network externalities, we don't need regulation.

- If network externality is large enough to overcome the innovation, we need some kind of solutions(regulation?). But we don't know good solution yet.
- Unfortunately anti-trust law handles only the traditional case.

Questionnaire survey on improvement of OS

How much percentage gain of benefit do you see in the new version OS compared with the old one?




Questionnaire survey of software

*Destinations of the Questionnaire
IT staff of Large Companies 953
IT staff of National and Private Universities 222
*Number of replies 738(62.8%)
*Date of survey December 2002

Strategic (Predatory) pricing

Retail Price : Excel vs Lotus, unit=yen



	Case 1			Case2			
Variable	Coefficien	t-statistic		Coefficien	t-statistic		
С	5.6126	(13.62)	* * *	11.930	(55.89)	* * *	Network
SHARE(-1)	0.0055	(2.62)	* * *	0.004	(2.85)	*	- externalities
LWAN	0.2377	(2.91)	* * *	0.335	(7.62)	* * *	work.
OC3	0.2901	(1.47)					1% share difference
OC12	0.1947	(1.03)					increases price by
OC48	0.0423	(0.15)					0.4%.
OC192	0.7735	(3.22)	* * *	0.533	• (2.50)	* *	The 70% difference in
ATMOC3	0.0774	(0.32)		0.223	(4.38)	* * *	share generates 28%
ATMOC12	0.2533	(1.56)					difference in the price
E100	0.003	(0.01)					Ĩ
EGB	0.444	(2.25)	**	0.595	▲ (4.24)	***	These coefficients
REDUNP	0.8772	(4.64)	* * *	0.602	∢ (3.69)	* * *	are large.
REDUNR	0.1483	(0.58)					Introducing these
IPV6	-0.9837	-(2.83)	* * *				new functions
CWQ	-0.1388	-(0.32)					increase the price
PRQ	0.7601	(2.41)	* * *				by 50%
RSVP	0.253	(0.81)					09000
MPLS	0.949	(3.16)	* * *	0.522	🖌 (2.97)	* * *	
RED	-0.3671	-(0.77)					
NEBS	-0.2156	-(1.12)					
n	76			76			
F	81.6503			162.715			
R2	0.9652			0.943662			
AdjustedR2	0.9533			0.937863			

Routers: Results of Hedonic model

Hedonic Price model

• Model

- Price(i,t) = c + a*<u>Users(i,t-2)</u> [or a*<u>Share(i,t-2)]</u>+ b*(control variables) + e_{it}

 Other control variables:Scanner image editing, address by Zip code, intelligent template, etc

Mobile Phone: Hedonic price model

- Price = $8014 + 0.67^{*}$ <u>Users</u> + 870^{*} Area (7.78) (5.78) +4651*ln(melodies)+28*WaitTime+19*Memories (5.44) (2.87) (2.26) -2797*time+21*time² +e (-18.5) (9.81) n=124, R2=0.886(0.880) •Price = 14389 + 340*<u>Share</u> + 588*Area +(control variables) (16.7) (5.40) n=124, R2=0.929(0.925)
- <u>Therefore network externality is verified</u>
 - A million of users raises user's utility by <u>670 yen</u>.
 - Ten percent point increase of the share raises user's utility by <u>3400 yen</u>.
- Note that the power of NE is not much stronger than other variables such as area, waiting-time etc.