- EX-ANTE COMPETITION ASSESSMENT IN NATIONAL / LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

-EX-POST ASSESSMENT IN MOBILE PHONE MARKET

ICN Advocacy Workshop


"From barriers to prosperity"

Friday, March 1, 2019

Plenary: Competition assessment

Takujiro Kono Japan Fair Trade Commission

EX-ANTE COMPETITION ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL LEVEL



Ex-ante assessment

- Competitive Impact Checklist
 - ► Limit the number of suppliers
 - ► Limit the ability of suppliers to compete
 - Induce the anticompetitive conducts
 - ► Limit the choices of consumers)
- Designated by Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
- Forwarded to JFTC
- ▶ If negative impact to competition is expected
 - <u>Ex-post assessment</u> is a "MUST"

- ▶ Japan Fair Trade Commission
 - Examine ALL results of C.A. conducted by regulatory bodies
 - Whether or not final appraisals are well-grounded
 - ▶ Whether or not proposed ex-post assessment appropriate
 - ▶ Ex-post assessment term, indexes used for the assessment



EX-ANTE IMPACT ANALYSIS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS



- JFTC assists local governments, based on its experience of competition assessment in national level
- "Handbook" is supplemented by
 - Guidance as to relationship b/w administrative activities and anti-competitive conduct
 - Various hypothetical case studies
- Once "Handbook" is published
 - ▶ JFTC distributes widely to local governments nationwide (more than 1750 number of bodies) with thousands of copies
 - ► Extensive efforts to consultation & further guidance

MOBILE PHONE MARKET (2018. 6. 28) - SECTORIAL EX-POST ASSESSMENT -

▶ What motivated the choice of the sector



- ► Resource utilized
 - ▶ Preceding market survey in 2016
 - External opinions (business, consumers, academics)
 - Web questionnaire
 - Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

► Main results

► Long-term consumer contracts (generally 2 – 4 years)

*Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

- ▶ Insufficient supply of used phones (5% of total)
- ▶ SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) Card locked
- ▶ Bundling of communication fees and device prices

MOBILE PHONE MARKET EX-POST ASSESSMENT

Outcome (1): JFTC's initiatives for changes in mobile phone market regulation

NTT, KDDI, and Softbank: MNOs which provide wireless communications services, and own all the infrastructures necessary to sell and deliver services to an end user

10.30% h rvices, ssary

■ Softbank

MVNO: Providers of a wireless communications services, which do not own the wireless network infrastructure to provide services to its customers.

MVNO enters into an agreement with MNO to obtain access to network services at wholesale rates

→ Interconnection charges

 JFTC Recommends to Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

- Design regulations
- Reduce interconnection charges for promote competition

Decision of wave frequency allocation should be made with the consideration of declining interconnection charges to competitors

■NTT Docomo ■KDDI Group

MVNO

Share of Mobile

Market

Secure transparency in evaluating interconnection charges to check if the management and the calculation are reasonable and efficient

MOBILE PHONE MARKET EX-POST ASSESSMENT

▶ Outcome (2): Chain reactions and collaborations

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

New formula to calculate interconnection charges


Unbundle
Communication fees
and
Device prices

Prime minister's advisory body for regulatory reform

Joint market survey on supply shortage of used phone in the market

by JFTC and MIC

Enforce
Telecommunications
Business Act
And
Antimonopoly Act



For MVNO

Elements based on which it sets up strategies more predictable

- → Strengthening telecom line enhancement
- More focused promotion to consumers

Enhanced Competitive Environment

- → Lower switching barriers
- → More varieties of devices
- → Cheaper device prices and fees/charges

Thank you for you attentions!!

Takujiro Kono Japan Fair Trade Commission