An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Leniency Programs

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タイトル，著者，概要	本文（PDF)
"An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Leniency Programs" (2007年1月) 　濱口　泰代（名古屋市立大学大学院経済学研究科講師）　石川　淑子（日立総合計画研究所）　石本　将之（公正取引委員会事務総局) 　木村　友二（競争政策研究センター研究員）　丹野　忠晋（跡見学園女子大学マネジメント学部助教授）概要　We experimentally study repeated procurement auctions with leniency programs. Leniency programs give immunity from fines to cartel firms which report to the antitrust authorities about their illegal activities. In our experiments, subjects can freely communicate before bidding, through an online chat system. We investigated whether introducing leniency programs is more effective at deterring cartels than an institution which only imposes a fine against bid rigging. Our results show that leniency programs are only as effective at deterring cartels as the institution with the fine. In addition to that, our results show that leniency programs may be effective to dissolve pre-existing collusions and make the contract price lower, but they are not powerful enough to dissuade firms from forming a new cartel and raising the transaction price. JEL classification codes: L4, D44 Keywords: Procurement Auction, Leniency Programs, Bid Rigging, Communication, Experimental Economics.	CPDP 24-E(PDF:510KB)

タイトル，著者，概要

本文
（PDF)

"An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Leniency Programs" (2007年1月)
　濱口　泰代（名古屋市立大学大学院経済学研究科講師）
　石川　淑子（日立総合計画研究所）
　石本　将之（公正取引委員会事務総局)
　木村　友二（競争政策研究センター研究員）
　丹野　忠晋（跡見学園女子大学マネジメント学部助教授）
概要
　We experimentally study repeated procurement auctions with leniency programs. Leniency programs give immunity from fines to cartel firms which report to the antitrust authorities about their illegal activities. In our experiments, subjects can freely communicate before bidding, through an online chat system. We investigated whether introducing leniency programs is more effective at deterring cartels than an institution which only imposes a fine against bid rigging. Our results show that leniency programs are only as effective at deterring cartels as the institution with the fine. In addition to that, our results show that leniency programs may be effective to dissolve pre-existing collusions and make the contract price lower, but they are not powerful enough to dissuade firms from forming a new cartel and raising the transaction price.
JEL classification codes: L4, D44
Keywords: Procurement Auction, Leniency Programs, Bid Rigging, Communication, Experimental Economics.

CPDP
24-E(PDF:510KB)