Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement (2009.2)

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CPDP- 37-E (PDF:259KB)	"Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement" (2009.2) Tadanobu Tanno (Atomi University) This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable against the competition after a potential veto to take part in bid-rigging. JEL classification codes: C72, D44, D82, L44, H57. Keywords: bid rigging, collusion, procurement, ratifiability

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Contents，Author

"Ratifiable Collusion and Bidding Systems in Procurement" (2009.2)
Tadanobu Tanno (Atomi University)
This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable against the competition after a potential veto to take part in bid-rigging.
JEL classification codes: C72, D44, D82, L44, H57.
Keywords: bid rigging, collusion, procurement, ratifiability