A note on conglomerate mergers: The Google/Fitbit case (2023.1)
Abstract | File(PDF) |
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We consider conglomerate mergers using the Google/Fitbit case as an example. First, summarizing the importance of conglomerate merger control and the current enforcement standards for such mergers by competition laws, we briefly describe a review of the Google/Fitbit merger by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. Next, we explain the background of the merger and introduce Chen et al. (2022), who theoretically discuss a cross-market merger by considering the Google/Fitbit merger. Finally, we discuss the implications of Chen et al. (2022) for controlling conglomerate mergers. Specifically, personalized pricing based on data analytics can be a foreclosure device; in particular, merger-specific efficiencies can foster market foreclosure. |
CPDP-89-4-E(PDF:496KB) |