The Effects of Non-assertion of Patents Provisions -R&D Incentives in Vertical Relationships-

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タイトル，著者，概要	本文（PDF)
"The Effects of Non-assertion of Patents Provisions -R&D Incentives in Vertical Relationships-"(2011年4月) 　松島　法明（大阪大学社会経済研究所准教授）　荒井　弘毅（公正取引委員会競争政策研究センター）　石橋　郁雄（大阪大学国際公共政策研究科）　泉水　文雄（神戸大学大学院法学研究科教授）概要 Using a simple downstream duopoly model with vertical relations and downstream R&D, we investigate the effect of non-assertion of patents (NAP) provisions. A monopoly upstream firm decides whether to employ NAP provisions. If it does so, it freely incorporates the R&D outcomes into its inputs. Incorporation improves the efficiency of the downstream firms’ production. We have interpreted the introduction of NAP provisions as a source of technology spillover. Using the technologies of two downstream firms is optimal for the upstream firm if and only if the degree of technology spillover is small. In addition, if the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is significant, such technology spillovers erode both the profit of the efficient downstream firm and social welfare. We interpret our result in the context of an actual antitrust case related to this model. Keywords: vertical relations, investment, technology spillover, NAP provisions JEL Classification codes: K43, L11	CPDP 49-E(PDF:247KB)

タイトル，著者，概要

本文
（PDF)

"The Effects of Non-assertion of Patents Provisions -R&D Incentives in Vertical Relationships-"(2011年4月)
　松島　法明（大阪大学社会経済研究所准教授）
　荒井　弘毅（公正取引委員会競争政策研究センター）
　石橋　郁雄（大阪大学国際公共政策研究科）
　泉水　文雄（神戸大学大学院法学研究科教授）
概要
Using a simple downstream duopoly model with vertical relations and downstream R&D, we investigate the effect of non-assertion of patents (NAP) provisions. A monopoly upstream firm decides whether to employ NAP provisions. If it does so, it freely incorporates the R&D outcomes into its inputs. Incorporation improves the efficiency of the downstream firms’ production. We have interpreted the introduction of NAP provisions as a source of technology spillover. Using the technologies of two downstream firms is optimal for the upstream firm if and only if the degree of technology spillover is small. In addition, if the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is significant, such technology spillovers erode both the profit of the efficient downstream firm and social welfare. We interpret our result in the context of an actual antitrust case related to this model.
Keywords: vertical relations, investment, technology spillover, NAP provisions
JEL Classification codes: K43, L11

CPDP
49-E(PDF:247KB)