SHOJI ISHII
Hearing Examiner, Fair Trade Commission of Japan
October 8 -10, 1997
The International Symposium on Justie and Efficiency in Law Enforcement
Qingdao , People's Republic of China
1 Introduction
It is a great pleasure to meet with you in this timely conference,and to share a few thoughts on this most challenging subject.
Ensuring efficiency and fairness is a contemporary problem which we have been tackling.
Japan has been faced with a major task of further improving the quality of people's life as well as thoroughly integrating its domestic market into international market. It has been also pointed out that some aspects of the Japanese economy system and trade practices are too stiffened and fatigued to cope with rapidly and incessantly changing economic environment. For these reasons, more active and efficient competition policy has been called upon from home and abroad, and improving the efficiency of law enforcement has been one of the most important concerns for the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (hereinafter referred to as "JFTC").
Justice and fairness in law enforcement have been guaranteed by a variety of laws, and in addition, high morale of the government officials has contributed to ensuring them. However,there were two developments worth mentioning. Recent bribery scandal by high government officials brought about a severe criticism from the general public, which resulted in tightening ethical standards. Quite differently, the Tokyo High Court in a recent decision showed that fairness should be more seriously considered in the JFTC's proceedings.
Roughly speaking, my presentation today will be in four parts. First, I would like to introduce the JFTC's organization and proceedings in general for facilitating your understanding. Second, I will talk about topic 1(how to improve efficiency and ability)extensively. Third, I will discuss topic 2 (guaranteeing justice and fairness), briefly touching upon topic 3 (supervisory system). Finally, some concluding remarks will be made.
Before entering into substance, I put in a caveat. The views expressed here are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of the JFTC.
2 The JFTC's Organization and Proceedings
(1) The JFTC is established as an administrative organ to enforce the Japanese competition law, namely the Antimonopoly Act. The JFTC occupies an unique position among the Japanese administrative organization in that it is an independent administrative commission composed of a chairman and four commissioners which acts independently without being controlled by other agencies and ministries in implementing the Act. This institutional setting is aimed at contributing to securing fair and efficient enforcement of the Act. One reason is that; because the Antimonopoly Act provides the fundamental rules for companies doing business in a free economic society, its implementation must not be politically influenced and it must be fairly enforced by a neutral organization. The other is that;as the Act is applied to ever-changing and complicated economic surroundings, its efficient implementation requires highly specialized knowledge of law and economics. For securing independency, status of the chairman and four commissioners are guranteed.
The General Secretariat (545 people as of fiscal 1997, hereinafter the same) is attached for carrying out the business of the JFTC. It consists of the Secretariat (75 people), the Economic Affairs Bureau (142 people), the Investigation Bureau(191 people) and seven local offices (131 people). Hearing examiners(5 people) are situated within the General Secretariat, but outside the Secretariat and these Bureaus. The Investigation Bureau is mainly responsible for investigation of the possible violations. The number of people of the Investigation Bureau has increased year by year, and now the Bureau is the largest organization inside.
Organization chart of the JFTC is attached as Appendix 1.
(2) The JFTC plays two roles in enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act -one administrative, the other quasi-judicial. In administrative function, the JFTC issues interpretative guidelines,responds to consultations and inquiries from entrepreneurs or governmental agencies, keeps public relations, advocates competition policy and so on.
In quasi-judicial function, it investigates and decides cases. All the proceedings are made within the JFTC in view of efficiency, but investigation proceedings are separated from hearing procedure from the viewpoint of fairness. There are three main illegal conducts which are prohibited by the Antimonopoly Act, that is unreasonable restraint of trade (cartel), private monopolization and unfair trade practices.
(3) I would like to explain investigation and hearing procedure more precisely.
A. Initiation of a Preliminary Investigation
The JFTC initiates a preliminary investigation with regard to a possible violation when it obtains information by either of the following ways.
1) Report by the public
2) Detection by the JFTC
3) Notification from the Prosecutor General
To gather reliable information is the most important as the threshold of investigation.
B. Formal Investigation
After a preliminary investigation, the JFTC decides whether it moves to a formal investigation, and takes compulsory measures. The JFTC is empowered to take the following compulsory measures.
(a) Ordering persons concerned or witnesses to appear in the JFTC for interrogating, to state their opinion or to file with the JFTC special reports.
(b) Ordering expert witnesses to appear in the JFTC to have them give expert testimony.
(c) Ordering persons in possession of financial records and other relevant documents to submit the same, and retaining such documents submitted, or
(d) Entering any place of business or other necessary premises of the persons concerned, and inspecting the said business operations and property, financial records and other documents.
Normally, it is the investigators designated by the JFTC who actually conduct these measures.
C. Recommendation, Hearing Procedure and Decision
When the JFTC finds that there exists any violation of the Antimonopoly Act, it usually recommends that the party concerned take measures appropriate to eliminate the violative act. In case where the JFTC is unable to prove violation but there is some doubt about violation, the JFTC takes an informal measure such as warning and caution.
If the party concerned complies with the recommendation, a decision (recommendation decision) will be issued along the lines of the said recommendation without resorting to a hearing procedure. Most cases are settled and terminated by this course.
When the recommendation is not accepted, the JFTC initiates a hearing procedure by issuing a complaint against the party concerned (respondents), and hearing examiners usually preside a hearing procedure to decide whether or not there is enough evidence to prove a violation. Hearing examiners are designated by the JFTC among its personnel. The personnel who have performed the duty of an investigator of the case concerned and those who have been involved in the investigation of the case are disqualified and not designated as hearing examiners. This hearing procedure is similar to the one employed in courts. Hearings from the relevant persons and witnesses are made, and evidence is produced by the JFTC's investigators and attorneys representing the respondents. After that, hearing examiners make an initial decision. The transcript of the decision is served on the respondents, and they are entitled to file an objection in writing against the initial decision within two weeks, which is reviewed by a commissioners' meeting. As I will explain it later in some detail, it was decided that commissioners who had been involved in the investigation of the relevant case must not participate in the decision making process of the same case usually. The Chairman and two or more commissioners shall attend the commissioners' meeting which discusses whether it sustains the initial decision, with revision if necessary. Then, the final decision (formal decision) is issued by the JFTC. Any person who is dissatisfied with the decision can obtain a review of such decision in the Tokyo High Court. The decision of the court may be appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus, the JFTC plays a role of a court of first instance, which represents quasi-judicial aspect of the JFTC.
D. Surcharge
In case where a price-related cartel is conducted, a surcharge is levied on the cartel members and constituent members of a trade association which conducted the cartel. A surcharge is an administrative measure to ensure the effectiveness of cartel prohibition and is assessed upon calculation by certain formulas.
E. Criminal Proceeding
Violations of the Antimonopoly Act may result in penalties as a criminal act. For example, any person who committed cartel or private monopolization may be imprisoned with compulsory labor for not more than three years or liable for a penalty of not more than five million yen(with regard to enterprise, a penalty is up to a hundred million yen). The main criminal offenses of the Antimonopoly Act can be prosecuted only after an accusation of the JFTC has been filed to the Prosecutor General.
In June 1990, the JFTC published a statement concerning the standard of criminal accusation, which announced that the JFTC would bring accusation for criminal punishment more actively in such cases as;
1) pernicious and serious violation which may have extensive adverse effects to the general public's life(e.g. price fixing cartel, collusive tendering and concerted refusal to deal)
2) repetitive violation which administrative procedure by the JFTC is less likely to attain the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act.
The JFTC proceedings are attached as Appendix 2.
3 How to Improve Efficiency and Ability
(1) If we interpret law enforcement broadly,and consider how to improve the efficiency of competition authority at large, it is important to keep balance of administrative and quasi-judicial functions.
Administrative function such as issuance of guideline or response to consultation may prevent violations so that human and material resources which otherwise should have devoted to investigation would be saved. Also, public support of the Antimonopoly Act invoked by public relations may put pressure on the possible offenders to observe the Act. Further, educational sessions for procurement officers of governmental entities with regard to the Antimonopoly Act and its enforcement may make them more aware of the possible bid-rigging and induce them to devise a procurement method which would be less susceptible to bid-rigging. Investigation takes time and consumes energies, so this preventive methods seem to enhance the efficiency of competition authority.
However, if we relied on the preventive methods exclusively and lacked strong enforcement against violations,entrepreneurs might consider law enforcement as lenient and venture to bring about more violations.
So, proper number of officers should be allotted to administrative and quasi- judicial functions so as to minimize violations, while maintaining strong enforcement against violations.
(2) Next, we confine the law enforcement more narrowly, that is law enforcement against possible violations which mainly focuses on investigation. We have approached the solution of the problem from several different directions.
A. Employment of Effective Means to Deter Violations
When can we regard law enforcement and its officers as efficient? One criterion is that violations are deterred and decrease after the law enforcement. There are several available means in the Antimonopoly Act, among which a criminal accusation has the strongest deterrent effects. But, the most important thing here is to choose the most effective means to deter violations. One reason why the JFTC published a statement concerning criminal accusation in 1990 and launched criminal accusation is that we realized "the punishment should correspond to the offense."
Simultaneously, if the existing means do not work completely well, more ammunition should be provided. It is important to revise competition law provisions so as to maintain and enhance deterrence effects against violations. In this respect, two amendments were made recently.
First, rate of surcharge was raised significantly in 1991. The new rate of surcharge was set, in principle,at six percent of sales of goods or services generated during the period in which cartel was conducted, four times higher than before.
Second, a criminal provision of the Antimonopoly Act was amended in 1992, which set the maximum fine for enterprises and trade associations at a level separate from the maximum fine for individuals, and raised it by twenty times, from five million yen to one hundred million yen.
B. Classification of Cases
The Investigation Bureau investigates some 200 cases annually. This caseload is rather demanding, therefore we can not handle all the cases as formal investigation. As a matter of necessity, we are obliged to classify cases in the order of importance from the beginning, namely, at preliminary investigation stage.
It is efficient to set case's objective(recommendation, warning or caution) and allocate the case to investigators, since informal measures such as warning or caution require less evidence than recommendation, and if the objective of investigation is set as such, it will be attained by less time and less human resources. By classification, we can finish more cases while concentrating more energy on cases which recommendation is aimed at.
In addition, some cases require rapidity to deal with. For example, unjust low price sale by a company may cause a substantial and irreparable damage to the surrounding small and medium sized companies unless some corrective measures are taken swiftly. In this case, informal measures are more appropriate and effective.
C. Flexible and Problem-solving Oriented Organization
How to structure organization is very much related to the efficiency of law enforcement officers. I would like to show a couple of examples.
(a) Establishment of the Special Investigation Department
The amendment bill to strengthen the JFTC organization passed the Diet on June 7,1996 which totally reorganized the office of the JFTC. It was expected that the reorganization would enhance agility, efficiency, policy-planning and coordination capability of the JFTC. For serving this purpose, the special Investigation Department was established, which is mainly responsible for investigating criminal accusation and significant violation cases quickly.
Before this department was established, all the investigation was typically made in the following way. Two or three cases a year were allocated to a division which had ten investigators. So, as an average, three or four investigators were in charge of a case from the beginning to the end. It took nine to twelve months to complete a case.
In some serious or difficult cases including criminal accusation cases, it was recognized that this case allocation system was too rigid to perform their investigation efficiently. In these cases, much more investigators were needed to substantiate violation, especially at the initial investigation stage. More flexible organization was sought, which led to the Special Investigation Department.
The very first case since the establishment of the department demonstrated the validity of the reform. This was a bid-rigging case regarding water meters ordered by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Criminal accusations were filed against 25 companies and 34 individuals in February, 1997. The investigation was initiated by a compulsory measure in July 1996, accordingly it took only seven months to finish the case. The reform for flexible organization apparently contributed to this success. During the first two weeks at the outset of the investigation when violators were not fully prepared, some 40 investigators were mobilized and most evidence and testimonies which substantiated violation were collected. Then the number of investigators was reduced to 20, and three months later, the number was further reduced to 14.
(b) Establishment of Task Force
From the viewpoint of making the Japanese market internationally more open, the JFTC established a task force which specialized in import restrictions and price differentials between Japanese and overseas market issues in March 1995. Since then,this task force has intensively investigated these two issues. The result of this specialization is positive because of accumulation of experience and information. More than ten recommendation were made as a result of investigation made by this task force.
D. Enhancement of the Efficiency and Ability of Investigators
(a) Training
Investigation has become more and more difficult. One thing is that the gradual increase of the number of investigators have not catch up with the dramatically increased caseload. Another thing is that the recent severer law enforcement by the JFTC may make the party under investigation more resistant, and information-gathering and testimony-taking by investigators become harder to do.
In these circumstances, it is essential to provide investigators with adequate training programs in order to enhance their skill and ability. The Investigation Bureau divides investigators into four groups in the main, namely novice, class of a few years experience, that of the intermediate and that of the seasoned. The aim of the training in general is to share information about their most recent investigation experience. But, training program has a different goal from one class to another. For example, the goal of novice class is to acquire fundamental knowledge on practical business of investigation and legal theory. On the other hand, that of the seasoned is to make research on and develop new technique to bring cases to satisfactory conclusions. The Investigation Bureau reinforced the training programs last year drastically ,therefore, the outcome are yet to be seen.
(b) Reward
Morale of investigators in the Investigation Bureau is high. However, because of their strenuous and stressful works, some incentives to raise their spirits are worth considering. The Investigation Bureau introduced the commendation system in which it honors investigators with excellent services, in April this year.
(c) Setting a Time-table
The Investigation Bureau attempted to set a timetable of investigation several times in the past. Timetable means an average standard to make efforts, not a stringent time limit,because one case is quite different from another in terms of scale,difficulty and the relevant party's cooperativeness. Timetable may induce investigators to work more deliberately and harder.
E. Provision of Computer and Other Electric and Telecommunication Appliances
Finally, it is critical for efficient investigation to provide such equipment as personal computer, fax,copying machine and portable telephone in this electric and telecommunication technology age. I would like to offer a couple of examples.
Personal computer is very helpful for investigating bid-rigging cases. Investigators usually ask the relevant governmental agencies to report goods or services they ordered, method employed for ordering, contract price, and so on. At almost the same time, investigators command the private party under investigation to report the relevant governmental agencies from which orders were received, goods and services on which contracts were awarded, bid prices and so on. Then, they compare these two reports with each other and analyze how completely and broadly the bid-rigging was conducted. Because an enormous amount of goods or services was involved as a rule,investigators can save time and get more precise results by inputting all the information for sorting.
Portable telephone is useful when investigators enter the business sites of companies or associations to inspect documents and collect evidence. If an investigator finds a good evidence, or he considers more investigators are needed for search, he can easily communicate such information with other investigators far away by a portable telephone, so that other investigators can move more quickly and properly. Otherwise, he has to go out and find a public telephone, in some situations, timegap brought by this conduct may result in a loss of important evidence.
To back investigators up, the JFTC tries to keep abreast of the times.
(3) Now, looking at this efficiency problem from a different angle, I would like to consider the relationship between investigation and hearing procedure. From the solely efficiency point of view, it may be quite inefficient and time-consuming for investigators to be involved in a hearing procedure. They have to devote a lot of time to preparing for and attending at the hearing procedure. If there were not any hearing procedure, they would apply their full energy and time to investigation. However, because hearing procedure is one of the keystones for guaranteeing fairness, it is impossible for us to get around this hearing procedure. Two ways of coping with hearing procedure efficiently might be considered. One is to conduct a thorough investigation and evidence-gathering. Because of this, while investigators become more confident of the case and take less time for preparing for a hearing procedure, respondents are more likely to give up the case earlier. The other is to raise investigators who specialize in hearing procedure. This may be efficient because they will be more familiar with hearing procedure and accumulate experience concerning how to prepare for and deal with a hearing procedure.
4 Codes of Conduct to Guarantee Justice and Fairness
(1) Separation of Investigation and Hearing Procedure Within the JFTC
The Rule concerning Investigation and Hearing Procedure of the JFTC(hereinafter referred to as "the Rule") is designed to separate those functions that are adversarial in nature (investigation) from those that are adjudicative(hearing procedure). Hearing procedure is basically trial procedure, in which neutrally situated hearing examiners receive briefs and listen to arguments from investigators and attorneys representing respondents, then decide the case. Because investigators' conducts are reviewed and disciplined by a hearing procedure, this may induce investigators to act fairly, when they investigate cases.
(2) Procedural Justice and Fairness
Justice and fairness are incorporated into procedural provisions of the Antimonopoly Act and the Rule. I would like to mention several provisions.
A. Inspection of Premises
Where an inspection of premises is to be conducted by investigators, they shall be required to carry their identification cards and to show them to the persons concerned (Section 46 (3) of the Antimonopoly Act). Identification card accompanies a slip of paper which states case number, name of the case, investigator's name and date of designation of the investigator. In addition, before investigators begin their inspection, they explain to the persons concerned what is the case which they are investigating. Therefore, the company or persons under inspection clearly understand the scope and object of investigation and are able to protect themselves against abuse of investigators.
When investigators obtain documentary evidence in the possession of the persons and companies concerned in accordance with Section 46 (1) of the Antimonopoly Act, they shall keep a record which states name of the case, documentary evidence retained,name of its holders or submitters, the address and the date of the order of submittance. Copy of the record must be delivered to the holders or submitters, if they so request (Section 14 of the Rule). Because they are aware that investigators hold the specified evidence,they can defend more easily. Also, investigators are prevented from bringing totally irrelevant evidence by the provision. A party may move to quash or limit a investigator's compulsory measure by filing a petition with the JFTC within 7 days after the measure.
B. Interrogation and Statement
Investigators may interrogate and question the relevant party or witness if they think it necessary in the course of investigation. A statement of the relevant party or witness may be taken down in writing, and this written statement must be read by or read to him. If he ascertains the accuracy of the contents, he will be requested to sign and seal it(Section 12 of the Rule). This provision guarantees that the statement is voluntarily made and is not distorted.
C. Notification to the Person who Reported and Asked for Investigation
Any person may, when he considers that a fact in violation exists, report the fact to the JFTC and ask for the necessary measures. The JFTC, upon receipt of such report, shall make the necessary investigation with regard to the case. In case where any report submitted specifies in writing any concrete fact pursuant to the provisions of rules of the JFTC, after the JFTC decides to take, or not to take measures, the JFTC shall promptly notify the reporter of the decision of the JFTC (Section 45 of the Antimonopoly Act).
This provision sets forth that a private party can "play a part in" the investigation process of the JFTC. The other function may worth mentioning; because the JFTC has the exclusive power to determine whether investigations are to be conducted and can dispose of cases at his discretion, this provision may guard against unwarranted decisions not to initiate investigation. To notify the reporter of the result will heighten the transparency of the JFTC investigation proceeding.
(3) Protection of Confidential Information
The chairman, each commissioner and personnel of the JFTC shall not divulge or make surreptitious use of trade secrets and commercial or financial information which are confidential and obtained from entrepreneurs during a law enforcement (Section 39 of the Antimonopoly Act).
While this provision encourages cooperation by persons having information useful to investigators, it protects persons who submit confidential information to the JFTC from the unfair disadvantages which would result from its publication.
(4) Ethical Code
First of all, the JFTC investigators are public officials of the national government who are subject to the penal code and the Government Officials Act. So, acceptance of a bribery from the relevant party constitutes a crime and is punished accordingly. I proudly report here that the JFTC has never had such a deplorable event. There is a strict unwritten code of conduct inside the Investigation Bureau which has been faithfully observed. For example, the code says that investigators can take a cup of Japanese tea and not more when they visit offices of companies under investigation.
However, over the last two years there have been successive scandals caused by high government officials of other agencies who are in a position of supervising, authorizing or having a strong influence over the industries concerned. They took bribes, or were entertained with dinner, golf, present etc., from the private party who were closely connected with their business. The general public had a serious doubt about the fairness of their performing duty. Criticism against government officials in general kept mounting.
At this juncture, in connection with the national government measures to tighten discipline among government officials, the JFTC established an ethical code for securing the public trust in impartial law enforcement by the JFTC. This code is applied to all employees of the JFTC including investigators. Contact with the relevant party is severely restricted. Officials are prohibited from having dinner or playing sports with the relevant party, and from receiving goods, services and remuneration from them among other things.
(5) Disqualification of an JFTC Commissioner
The Tokyo High Court issued a ruling on February 25, 1994, regarding a petition by X company to overturn the JFTC's decision against the company. This case is the first precedent which is closely related to ensuring the fairness of law enforcement of the JFTC from a broader perspective, namely the fairness of hearing procedure distinct from that of investigation proceedings.
The relevant fact is as follows.
The JFTC initiated a formal investigation regarding this case in May 1988. On June 6, 1989, the JFTC recommended X and seven other companies to cease and desist price-fixing in which those companies had colluded to raise the delivery prices for domestic users of copper-plated phonemic paper laminate. The other seven companies accepted the recommendation, but X alone refused to follow it. Accordingly, the JFTC initiated a hearing procedure, and on September 16,1992 handed down a formal decision in which the JFTC found X violation. X filed a suit with the Tokyo High Court on October 16,1992, demanding that the decision be set aside. One important issue raised by X is involvement of commissioner A in the decision process. A was the Director-General of the Investigation Department of the JFTC from June 30,1987 to February 28, 1990, which position was to supervise and command investigators who were engaged in investigation including this case. After that, he was appointed as a commissioner. He attended commissioners' direct hearing on this case, was involved in commissioners' meeting which determined this case, and sign and sealed this decision.
In its ruling, after stressing quasi-judicial nature of hearing procedures of the JFTC, the Tokyo High Court decided that"it is strongly required that referees presiding this procedure should perform their duty fairly, and as its premise, it is indispensable that the referees should be impartial and not biased."
The Court concluded that the decision regarding this case, which Commissioner A was involved in and his involvement was unnecessary, was illegal because it damaged this impartiality or appearance of impartiality of the JFTC.
5 Supervisory System
I only touch upon this issue briefly.
We have a few different levels of meetings inside the JFTC which are held for dealing with investigation efficiently and properly, that is meetings presided by the director-general ,the secretary-general and commissioners. Through this three-tier examination, many errors and defects are corrected.
Service rating of investigators is conducted once a year. A predetermined form of paper for each investigator is delivered to the director who directly supervises investigators belonging to his division. He ranks each investigator and makes some comments on investigator's performance, aptitude and character, which is reviewed and reevaluated by the director- general and the secretary-general. It is probable that director's estimate of investigators will be a major factor in determining their chances of promotions, pay increases and the like.
6 Conclusion and Some Remarks for Future Development
(1) Now, I would like to review what I have shown you so far. In the first place, efficiency and ability are enhanced not by a simple-minded method, but by the overall measures including proper allocation of human resources, employment of effective means to deter violation, setting objectives of investigation in advance, streamlining organization, provision of adequate training and supply of the most advanced technology and equipment. In the second place, justice and fairness are guaranteed by separation of investigation and hearing procedure, various procedural provisions and ethical code as well as high morale of the JFTC officials.
(2) Let me conclude my statement with some consideration for the future development.
First, what is the relationship between efficiency and fairness? Critics of existing codes and procedures for guaranteeing fairness may point to the high degree of inefficiency caused by these codes and procedures in practice. However, because democratic institutions find their principal justification as a procedure or framework of justice and fairness, efficiency should be pursued to the extent that it would not impede fairness. To attain compatibility or to promote both values simulteneously, there exists no straightforward scientific method but empiricism. In this regard,comparative study is one of the most important information sources. I am certain that I will learn a lot from this symposium on this matter.
Second, no matter how well-organized and well-equipped competition authority is, it is the persons who actually do the work. In order to maintain efficiency and fairness, it is imperative for competition authority to establish clearly-stated ultimate end of competition policy. People work hard when they understand why they have to do so. By and large, officials of competition authority are busy with their routine work, for this reason a think tank might be required to set up for conducting theoretical and empirical study. However, this is not the whole story. Even though the ultimate purpose is agreed upon and clearly articulated, that is likely to be less tangible and it is usually difficult for law enforcement officers to assess the contribution of their specific activities toward the purpose. Some intermediate goals and value which are more palpable and tractable should be provided so that law enforcement officers can evaluate their attainment. For example, suppose that a follow-up study shows that as a result of the JFTC decision against cartel or bid-rigging, price has gone down significantly, but the relevant industry as a whole prospers because of acceleration of innovation or efforts for cost-down although some inefficient firms went out of business. Consumers are better off and the industry as a whole is not worse off at the least. Publication of this kind of study would heighten public estimation of the JFTC and encourage investigators to do cartel investigation more intensively.
Finally, but by no means least important,mental as well as physical health of law enforcement officers is the most invaluable property for efficient and fair law enforcement. It is generally assumed that efficiency increases with stress up to some point, then decrease as stress continues to increase. Too much stress or work may cause damage to their health, so that we may lose competent staffs. Optimal work allocation should be the serious concern for competition authority.
(3) I would like to thank the international symposium of SAIC for giving me this opportunity. I sincerely hope that my presentation is helpful for the participants of this symposium.